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Appellant The Building Contractors Association of Southwestern Idaho ("BCA") hereby
replies to arguments raised in Respondents' Briefs filed by the Idaho Public Utilities
Commission ("Commission") and Idaho Power Company ("Idaho Power" or "Company"). I

I.

INTRODUCTION

In each of their briefs, the Commission and Idaho Power emphasize the standard of
review recognized by this Court that gives substantial deference to the Commission's technical
expertise, its evaluation of evidence, and its fact finding. However, this case has less to do with
issues of fact than it does issues of law-namely, whether the Commission's action violates
Idaho's laws prohibiting rate discrimination. It is the province of this Court, not the
Commission, to decide whether, as a matter oflaw, the Commission's Order 30955 imposes an
unlawfully discriminatory rate and charge structure against new customers.
Indeed, in two prior cases in which the Commission sought to shift more of a utility
company's costs to new customers, this Court found that the Commission had exceeded its
authority by authorizing illegally discriminatory rates/charges, despite (predictably) the
Commission's arguments it had not. BCA submits that just as in Idaho State Homebuilders v.
Washington Water Power, 107 Idaho 415, 690 P.2d 350 (1984) ("Homebuilders") and Boise
Water Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm 'n, 128 Idaho 534, 916 P.2d 1259 (1996) ("Boise Water")

the Commission's arguments fail here too.

1 In this Reply, the Commission's Respondent's Brief is cited as "IPUC Brief' and the Company's
Respondent's Brief is cited as "IPCo Brief." BCA's initial Appellant's Brief is cited as "BCA Brief."
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Given the Commission's track record on the new customer/cost-shifting issue, and the
propensity for such cost-shifting to result in unlawful discrimination, BCA respectfully requests
this Court take a hard look at the effect of the Commission's Order 30955 on new customer
charges and recognize that the tariff approved by the Commission is discriminatory and
unjustified. Specifically, BCA urges the Court to examine the discriminatory results that flow
from the Commission's abandonment of its own longstanding principle governing line
extensions that required the Company to provide an allowance toward line extensions to serve
each new customer that approximated its per-customer embedded costs and required the new
customer to pay those line extension costs over and above the embedded cost-based allowance.
That principle was enunciated by the Commission in the 1995 Rule H Tariff Case ("1995
Case") based on the Company's express assurance, and the Commission's finding, that
allowances pegged to embedded costs provide a level playing field as between existing and new
customers. By re-grading the playing field based on a single conclusory statement that "different
circumstances exist now than did in 1995," the Commission runs afoul of this Court's decisions
in Homebuilders and Boise Water and the Commission's statutory duty to set non-discriminatory
rates and charges that are just and reasonable.
In this Reply, BCA also responds to Respondents' arguments concerning the
Commission's denial ofBCA's request for intervenor funding. A plain reading of the statute and
rules governing intervenor funding warrants a finding that BCA timely filed its request following
the filing of post-hearing briefs at the conclusion of the Commission's proceeding. Moreover, it
is arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to find that BCA did not represent the general
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body of users or consumers in this case, when the Commission had previously ruled precisely the
opposite in a similar proceeding and awarded BCA intervenor funding. The Commission also
abused its discretion in finding that BCA did not materially contribute to the case and that BCA's
fees and costs for its participation on reconsideration were "unreasonable." BCA's efforts below
were focused on the same issues argued here on appeal to ensure the Commission abides by this
Court's anti-discrimination rulings in Homebuilders and Boise Water and its own ruling in the
1995 Case establishing allowances based on embedded costs to maintain equal treatment of
existing and new customers.
Finally, BCA responds to Respondents' argument against awarding BCA attorney fees
on appeal as against the Commission under Idaho Code § 12-117 or, alternatively, under the
private attorney general doctrine. BCA presents facts and argument supporting the modification
of the holding in Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass 'n, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities
Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 401,871 P.2d 818 (1994) ("OOIDA"), that the Commission may not be

assessed attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-117 because it is a "legislative agency." In the
alternative, BCA argues that it has met the requirements of an award under the private attorney
general doctrine through its advocacy of the right of all new customers to pay non-discriminatory
rates and charges.
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II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Understanding the interrelationship between line extension charges,
allowances, embedded costs, and rates is essential to understanding this case.

BCA described the interrelationship between allowances, charges, embedded costs and
rates in the BCA Brief at 8-12. The discussion is summarized here for the Court's convenience
and, hopefully, for clarification.
At the outset, BCA agrees with the basic proposition that, to the extent "cost-causers"
(here, new customers requesting connection to the Idaho Power system) do not pay for a
component of their electric service (here, line extension costs), electric rates for all customers
will be higher than they would otherwise be. IPCo Brief at 4; IPUC Brief at 19; Order 30955, p.
21; R. Vol. IV, p. 668. This is because the Company either recovers its line extension costs
through upfront charges or through rates, and what it does not recover through one means it must
recover through the other.
The line extension costs the Company is entitled to recover through rates are called its
"embedded costs"-that is, those line extension costs that are not paid upfront by customers
connecting to the system, but rather are "embedded" in the rate structure paid by all customers.
See IPCo Brief at 5 n. 2 ("'Embedded costs' are a snapshot ofthe cost of facilities recovered in

rates at a given point in time. Future rate adjustments will reflect the change in current costs
over time.") Thus, with respect to line extension costs, Idaho Power recovers through rates
charged to all customers, existing and new, its distribution costs that are embedded in the rates
because the Company, rather than the customers who requested service, funded such costs.
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With this understanding, the issue of "allowances" can be addressed. Allowancessometimes called "company-funded allowances"-represent Idaho Power's investment, rather
than new customers' upfront investment, in distribution facilities that the Company is authorized
to recoup through electric rates paid by all customers. IPUC Brief at 5 ("The allowances
credited to new customers are funded by Idaho Power, [are] included in the Company's rate base
and are eventually recovered in the rates for all customers"); see also R. Vol. I, p. 168 (IPUC
Staff Comments); see also R. Vol. I, p. 26. (definition of "Line Installation Allowance" in
proposed version of 2009 Rule H Tariff included with Application).
If line extension allowances and embedded costs sound similar, that is because they are;
they both represent Idaho Power's investment in distribution facilities to serve new customers
that the Company is authorized to recover through electric rates paid by all customers.
So long as allowances do not exceed embedded costs, the Company will recover its
allowance/investment through existing rates, with no resulting "upward pressure" on rates.
Idaho Power's main witness, Mr. Gregory Said, testified to this:
Q.
[by Mr. Creamer] To the extent that the Company's investment in
distribution facilities to serve new customers does not exceed its current
embedded costs for distribution facilities, then the Company's current
rates are sufficient to recover the costs of the new facilities; would you
agree with that?
A.

[by Mr. Said] For that particular element of rates, yes ....

Q.
Mr. Said, if the revenues that the Company receives for - from its
new customers are sufficient to recover the embedded costs that the
Company has for line extensions and distribution facilities, then there is
no upward pressure on rates, is there?
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A.

Again, for that component.

Tr., Vol. II, p. 121, LL. 1-8; p. 123, LL. 17-23 (Said Cross). BCA's main witness, Dr. Richard
Slaughter, agreed:
... embedded cost approximates the Company's per customer level of investment
in distribution plant that it can recover through existing rates. To the extent that
the Commission desires to relieve upward pressure on rates, then limiting the
Company's investment in distribution to serve new customers to its current per
customer embedded costs for distribution facilities providing the same service to
existing customers accomplishes this.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 233, L. 2 through p. 234, L. 5.
On the other hand, an allowance that exceeds embedded cost will tend to cause "upward
pressure" on rates because the allowance/investment is greater than the amount the Company can
recover through existing rates. Conversely, an allowance that is less than embedded cost will
result in excess earnings to the Company on its distribution investment because the new
customer double pays for a portion of hislher distribution facilities--once upfront and once
through rates. Tr. Vol. II, p. 245, LL. 20-25. (The amount of double payment would be equal to
the difference between the allowance provided and the embedded cost recovered though rates.)

B.

The Commission-approved Rule H tariff unlawfully discriminates as between
new and existing customers and as between new customers who share a
transformer.

1.

The new Rule H tari(fdiscriminates.

Here, the Commission has pegged allowances to an arbitrary standard based on the cost
of terminal facilities rather than to the portion of line extension costs embedded in rates as it had
been previously. IPUC Brief at 17 ("The 1995 allowance was tied to an estimate of what new
customer distribution costs were embedded in rates."); Order 30955 at 22 ("allowances should be
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based upon the cost of standard terminal facilities .... "). The Commission and Idaho Power
assert that "[b]ecause the [new Rule H tariff] allowance is calculated on a per transformer basis
and not a per customer basis, the allowance inside and outside subdivisions provides the same
Company investment." IPUC Brief at 12; IPCo Brief at 9; Order at 21; R. Vol. IV, p. 668. This
statement is true insofar as it states the obvious-that a per transformer allowance provides the
same Company investment per transformer regardless of where that transformer is located. The
problem is that Idaho law is not concerned with discrimination amongst transformers; rather, it
prohibits discrimination between customers.
Under the per transformer allowance methodology, the only new customers who receive
a full allowance are those who do not share a transformer with another customer. The many new
customers who share transformers (i.e. who reside within subdivisions) will not receive the full
benefit of a per transformer allowance. This is discriminatory as between new customers.
Moreover, the new customer who receives an allowance that is less than embedded costs
(i.e. the new customer who shares a transformer), but pays the same rate as an existing customer
who received an allowance equal to embedded costs, is being discriminated against as compared
to the existing customer. This is because the new customer is being double-billed for a portion
of her cost to connect to the system while the existing customer was not. 2

2 BCA recognizes that it might be permissible (i.e. non-discriminatory) for the Company to provide a lessthan-embedded cost allowance to new customers if there were some after-the-fact true-up or if the new customers
also paid a different rate than existing customers (i.e. a rate that did not include the portion of other customers'
distribution facility costs embedded in existing rates). But either of these could be a difficult accounting process.
See Tr. Vol. II, p. 245, LL. 22-25.
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Neither Idaho Power nor the Commission dispute that customers sharing transformers
(up to ten) will receive a lesser allowance (i.e. lesser Company investment). IPCo Brief at 20
("subdivision developers with lots that share a transformer will receive a pro rata share of the
transformer allowance."); IPUC Brief at 25 ("Because customers share a transformer, Idaho
Power incurs lower costs to connect customers to its system"). They instead argue that this
disparity is warranted because it guarantees "the same Company investment" and because a per
lot allowance would give subdivision developers a "windfall." IPCo Brief at 19; see also IPUC
Brief at 25. This argument is a red herring.
The important point is that, to be non-discriminatory, each customer in a class paying the
same rate should receive the same level of Company allowance/investment because that puts
them on a level playing field in terms of the charges they thereafter pay to receive the same
service. To alleviate its concern over "windfalls" to developers, the Commission should provide
a per customer, not per transformer, allowance and work out an appropriate system of allowances
and refunds as it did under the 1995 Rule H tariff. See BCA Brief at 8-9 (discussing how refunds
and allowances worked under the prior Rule H tariff). The fact is, there were no "speculative
lots," IPCo Brief at 24, to create a windfall under the prior Rule H tariffs refund provisions
because developers received no refunds until new customers connected to the system. Id

2.

The new Rule H tariff violates Homebuilders and Boise Water.

The Commission and Idaho Power argue that Homebuilders and Boise Water do not
apply to this case. This is not surprising since, in both those cases, this Court held that
Commission-approved charges were unlawfully discriminatory despite the Commission's and
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applicant-utilities' urging to the contrary. But the Commission and Idaho Power are mistaken;
this Court's analyses in those cases are directly relevant to the new customer charges at issue
here. In addition, those cases require the Commission to set non-discriminatory rates and
charges unless there is sufficient justification for such disparity. Here, the Commission has
failed to adhere to these precedents.
The BCA Brief, at 27-31, discusses why the newly-approved Rule H tariff violates

Homebuilders and Boise Water. In summary, they prohibit unlawfully discriminatory charges
and require the Commission to justify any difference in rates and charges through a
"corresponding classification of customers that is based on such factors as cost of service,
quantity of resource use, differences in the condition of service or in the time, nature or pattern
of the customers' use." Boise Water, 128 at 539,916 P.2d at 1264; Homebuilders, 107 Idaho at
420,690 P.2d at 355 (substantively same language as quoted). The Commission did not make
such a justification, nor could it on this record because there are no significant differences
between new and existing customers, or between new customers who share or do not share
transformers, when considering these factors. See Tr. Vol. II, p. 123, L. 24 - p. 125, L. 10
(Company witness Said confirming no differences between new and existing customers in terms
of cost of service).
There is no dispute that the Company's line extension charges under the new Rule H
tariff are different than under the tariff approved in the 1995 Case. There also is no dispute that
the net effect of the change in line extension charges is that new customers will receive a smaller
Company-funded allowance than existing customers received. But rather than justify this
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disparity between customers based on the Homebuilders/Boise Water factors, the Commission
and Idaho Power simply assert "no discrimination is present 'when a non-recurring charge is
imposed upon a new customer' .... " R. Vol. IV, pp. 669-70 (Order 30955), and therefore "the
Commission does not need to justify the difference in new customer Company investment based
upon the factors enumerated in Homebuilders . ... " IPCo Brief at 17. Respondents are
mistaken.
The Homebuilders decision does not create a blanket exemption from its holding for
those charges that are deemed non-recurring and related only to distribution facilities. The
Homebuilders passage cited by the Commission3 merely recites what that case is not about. To
the extent Homebuilders recognizes that certain non-recurring charges related to distribution
facilities are exempt from the prohibition on discrimination, it does not wholly exempt such
charges. Rather, the passage in Homebuilders describes a situation where a "charge is imposed
to offset the cost of the utility's capital investment." Implicit in this statement are the concepts
that such a charge (1) is needed because the cost is not already recoverable through rates, and (2)
is commensurate with the cost and does not produce excess earnings in distribution facilities. To
the extent the cost already is being recovered through rates (i.e. that portion of the cost is
embedded in rates), also imposing a non-recurring charge for that cost amounts to double-billing
(which is unjust and unreasonable) and discrimination.
3

For the Court's convenience, the passage is reproduced here in full:

The instant case presents no factors such as when a non-recurring charge is imposed upon new
customers because the service they require demands an extension of existing distribution or
communication lines and a charge is imposed to offset the cost of the utility's capital investment.
Homebuilders, 107 Idaho at 421,690 P.2d at 356.
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In addition, there is no basis for Idaho Power's and the Commission's apparent position
that non-recurring charges for distribution facilities are inherently non-discriminatory. Even
without the inextricable link between charges/allowances and rates, discrimination occurs under
the Commission's per transformer methodology because customers sharing transformers receive
less of an allowance and ultimately are charged more than customers who do not.
Idaho Power also is wrong in its argument that "[s]o long as all potential new
customers/applicants are treated in a like manner as a 'customer class,' there is no unlawful
discrimination." IPCo Brief at 18. The suggestion implicit in this statement-which is made
express in the sentence following-is that new customers and existing customers are different
classes of customers that "are not similarly situated." ld BCA recognizes that "[n]ot all
differences in a utility's rates and charges as between different classes of customers constitute
unlawful discrimination ... ," id (quoting Homebuilders; emphasis added). However, "[a]ny
such difference (discrimination) ... must be justified by a corresponding classification of
customers that is based upon factors such as cost of service, quantity of electricity used,
differences in conditions of service, or the time, nature and pattern of the use." Homebuilders,
107 Idaho at 420,690 P.2d at 355. The Commission did not justify any difference in rates or
customer classification between existing and new customers using the Homebuilders factors, nor
could it based on the record. See Tr. Vol. II, p. 123, L. 24 - p. 125, L. 10 (Company witness Said
confirming no differences between new and existing customers in terms of cost of service). The
Commission-in Order 30955 and on appeal-and Idaho Power simply argue that the
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Commission need not analyze the Homebuilders factors because this case involves a nonrecurring charge for distribution facilities that is exempt from Homebuilders.

C.

The Commission's and Idaho Power's arguments are premised on factual
assumptions that are unsupported by evidence in the record.
1.

The record does not support the assertion that growth was not paying for
itself

Idaho Power argues here, as it did before the Commission, that the Rule H modification
was necessary to make "growth pay for itself." See IPCo Brief at 3 ("growth should pay its
way"); see also R. Vol. I, p. 61 (Rule H tariff modifications "will take a step toward growth
paying for itself'). Implicit in this assertion is an assumption that, under the previous Rule H
tariff, the Company was not recovering its costs for individual line extensions from persons
requesting them. However, the record contains no actual evidence of this. Despite this, the
Commission on appeal concludes that "under the old methodology, revenues generated after
connecting new customers were inadequate to cover the costs associated with serving those
customers." IPUC Brief at 17. Significantly, the words "costs associated with serving those
customers" is not the same as "costs associated with extending service to those customers." On
the evidence in the record, the Commission's statement is correct only if one includes generation
and transmission costs in the calculus of "costs associated with serving these customers."
Otherwise, there is no evidence in the record to support a contention that Idaho Power was
unable to recover its line extension costs to extend service under the prior Rule H tariff and
existing rates.
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Logically, evidence of this alleged inability to recover its costs for line extensions would
consist of Idaho Power's financial data. However, the Company did not (and still does not) point
to any such data because it apparently does not maintain it. Discovery requests from BCA and
Commission Staff seeking such infonnation produced Company responses that varied from "the
requested infonnation is not available" to " ... many of the data requested are not collected or
considered incomplete." Tr. Vol. II, p. 111, L. 4 - p. 113, L. 6. Hence, this infonnation is
missing from the record; instead, Idaho Power proferred only the bare allegation that "growth is
not paying its way" through testimony offered by Mr. Said. Tr. Vol. II, p.lOl, LL. 1-18.
The Commission Staff noted in its Comments filed with the Commission:
... Idaho Power has done no analysis to prove that growth is not paying for itself,
nor has the Company done any analysis to detennine specifically what amounts of
allowances can relieve upward pressure on rates. . .. The Company concludes
that a reduction in Company investment in new distribution plant is necessary and
proposes a reduction in allowances based strictly on policy without supporting
analysis.
R. Vol. I, p. 168. The Company subsequently has offered no additional evidence to correct this
deficiency. Absent any data by which one could actually analyze the "critical" issue of what
allowance would be appropriate to relieve an unproven "upward pressure" on rates attributable to
line extension costs, it is hard to see how the Commission could find that Idaho Power justified
its proposed tariff modification.
In juxtapose to the lack of evidence in the record showing that growth was not paying for
itself under the prior Rule H tariff, there is evidence that, heretofore, new customers (including
subdivision developers) have made significant capital contributions in aid of construction to
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make up the difference between the total costs of new distribution facilities and the portion of
those costs that the Company already was authorized to recover from the new customers through
existing rates (i. e., the embedded distribution cost). Tr. Vol. II, p. 241. And, as Dr. Slaughter
testified, whether by design or coincidence, the combination of allowances and refunds (both of
which the Company recovered through rates) and contributions (paid up-front by the new
customer connecting to the system) under the prior Rule H Tariff appeared to have allowed the
Company to recover its costs of individual line extensions from the persons requesting them
because the Company's investment/allowances approximated current embedded costs. Tr. Vol.
II, p. 243, L. 20 - p. 244 L. 3. As a result, the prior Rule H tariff charges/allowances presumably
were "just and reasonable" and not merely "promotional" as Idaho Power suggests at page 15 of
its Brief.
The only analyses in the record performed to determine an appropriate allowance (i.e. an
allowance that the Company could recover through its existing rates) was performed by
Commission Staff and by BCA's expert, Dr. Richard Slaughter. The Company made no effort to
produce a different analysis in rebuttal. The Company simply stated that Staff's and BCA's
numbers were too high because they included improper components. 4

4 BCA cautions that, at this point, the issue is not which components of the Company's distribution plant
should be included in embedded costs for determining allowances. The issue is whether, going forward, embedded
costs will be the controlling factor in determining the critically important amount of the allowance. See R. Vol. IV,
p. 640 ("[wJhether the allowance is applied in exact proportions toward the terminal facilities component, the line
extension component, or both, is not critical. The amount of the allowance is critical, however.").
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2.

There is no evidence ofdi{ferent circumstances warranting the Rule H
modification.

In Order 30955 and in Respondents' briefs on appeal the reason proffered for changing
the Rule H methodology was that "different circumstances exist now than did in 1995." IPUC
Brief at 18 (citing Order 30955 at 21). Order 30955 did not elaborate on what the different
circumstances might be and neither in the proceeding below nor on appeal has Idaho Power
explained what different circumstances warrant the Commission's abandonment of its conclusion
in the 1995 Case that new customers were entitled to allowances equal to embedded costs in
order to put them on a level playing field with existing customers.
Based on the record and the briefs the apparent different circumstance precipitating the
Rule H modification is that Idaho Power used to have "surplus generation and surplus
transmission," but it now finds itself "generation and transmission constrained." IPCo Briefat
15. However, it is not appropriate for the Company to bankroll additional transmission and
generation facilities by increasing new customer distribution facility charges (via decreasing
allowances below embedded cost). Boise Water, 128 Idaho at 539,916 P.2d at 1264 ("[t]o the
extent that the new hook-up fees are based on an allocation of the incremental cost of new
[generation and transmission] plant construction required by growth ... solely to new customers,
the fees unlawfully discriminate between old and new customers .... ").
The only permissible way for Idaho Power to fund additional generation and transmission
facilities, which are considered system-wide, is by increasing rates for all customers.
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3.

There is no basis for the assertion that per transformer allowances are
"just and reasonable. "

The Commission's abandonment of a per customer approach for setting line extension
allowances and charges in favor of a per transformer approach precludes a rational analysis about
what charges are ''just and reasonable" to Idaho Power and its customers. Under the per
transformer approach, the only thing to be determined is the average cost of single-phase and
three-phase transformers. This completely bypasses what the Commission identified in its 1995
Order as the "critical" issue-namely, what amount of allowance represents a level of investment
in line extensions that the Company can recover through existing rates paid by the new customer
without imposing such costs on existing customers who did not cause them to be incurred? The
answer to that question was supplied by the Company and agreed with by the Commission in the
1995 Case: it is an allowance based on the Company's embedded distribution cost, because that
treats existing customers and new customers equally.

4.

BCA is not advocating for a "windfall" to developers.

By assuming ab initio that an "appropriate allowance" is one equal to the cost of terminal
facilities rather than one that the Company will recover through rates, the Commission and Idaho
Power can then argue that providing per lot (i.e. per customer) refunds in subdivisions may result
in a "windfall" to subdivision developers because developers could receive more in refunds than
the Company invested in the terminal facilities. That line of reasoning overlooks the fact that
developers rarely, if ever, receive allowances/refunds that make up for their own capital
contributions toward distribution facilities. Under the per transformer approach, it is Idaho
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Power (and its existing customers) who will reap a windfall through rates. See BCA Brief at 1213 (discussing excess revenue generated by below-embedded cost allowances).

5.

The record does not disclose that the Company's alleged rate pressure is
attributable to line extension costs to serve new customers.

BCA does not dispute that Idaho Power faces increased costs in providing electrical
service to its customers; however, the record does demonstrate that the Company's alleged
failure to recover its line extension costs to serve new customers contributes to increased costs or
rates.
The Company in testimony, Tr. Vol. II, p. 101, LL. 1-6, and Idaho Power in its brief,
IPCo Brief at 14, refer to several recent rate cases as evidence that new customers were not
paying their way. But in those cases, the Company sought to increase its revenues to fund
generation and transmission facilities, or for other reasons not related to distribution. See IPC-E03-13 (2003) (Danskin gas peaking plant, re-licensing of mid-Snake, Shoshone Falls, and C.J.
Strike hydro plants, revise depreciation rates for electric plant in service, adjustments to account
for expiration of firm wholesale power supply contracts); IPC-E-05-14 (2005) (recovery for
increased cost of income taxes); IPC-E-05-2S (2005) (recognize expiration of temporary increase
for income tax settlement); IPC-E-07-08 (2007) (increase return on equity to 11.5%); IPC-E-0801 (2008) (include Danskin plant in rate base); IPC-E-08-10 (2008) (general revenue deficiency);
IPC-E-OS-I0 (200S) (revise Rule H to change charges for underground facilities to reflect actual
costs). Except for the 200S filing to increase its charges for installing underground facilities, the
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nature of these cases do not suggest that new customers are not paying their way with respect to
the cost of line extensions serving them.

D.

The Commission improperly denied RCA intervenor funding for
participating in the proceedings below

The Commission's grounds for denying BCA's intervenor funding are inconsistent with
the plain language of its rule implementing Idaho Code § 61-617A and with prior Commission
decisions concerning the nature of BCA as a party in similar proceedings. Its findings in this
regard also are inconsistent with the record of proceedings below.
1.

BCA's initially untimely request for intervenor funding was cured by the
Commission's continuance ofthe proceedings.

Under the Commission's Rule 164, IDAPA 31.01.01.164 implementing I.C. § 61-617A,
a party requesting intervenor funding must file its request "within fourteen days after the last
evidentiary hearing in a proceeding or the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders or
statements of position, whichever is last." (Emphases added).
The Commission issued its initial Order 30853 partially approving Idaho Power's Rule H
Tariff Amendment Application on July 1,2009. R. Vol. II, p. 3l3. Twelve days later, BCA filed
its initial request for intervenor funding. R. Vol. II, p. 327. Admittedly, that filing was made
more than fourteen days after the May 1, 2009 deadline for filing response comments established
in the Commission's Notice of Extension of Comment Deadline, Order No. 30746. R. Vol. I, p.
147. On July 22,2009, BCA filed its Petition for Reconsideration. R. Vol. II, p. 358.
Significantly, BCA's Petition was granted in part on August 19, 2009 by Interlocutory Order No.
30883 wherein the Commission directed the parties to file testimony and indicated that it would
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set the matter for a technical hearing. R. Vol. III, p. 408. Thus, as of August 19, 2009, both a
hearing date and new filing deadlines were established in the Commission's proceeding. 5
Consequently, May 1,2009 no longer was the last deadline in the proceeding. Because this last
deadline in the proceeding had not yet arrived, BCA's initial request for intervenor funding no
longer was late, but rather it became premature.
The Commission issued its Order denying BCA's initial intervenor funding request on
September 3, 2009, R. Vol. III, p. 428, i.e. after its order continuing the proceeding. BCA
reasonably believed that the operative language of Rule 164 would be applied consistently to
establish a new deadline for requesting intervenor funding for its participation in the entire
proceeding based on the continued hearing schedule. BCA, therefore, did not seek
reconsideration of the Commission's September 3,2009 Order. Instead, BCA timely filed a
renewed request for intervenor funding on November 9, 2009, which was within 14 days of what
became the last briefing deadline in the proceeding (post-hearing briefs due October 27,2009).

2.

BCA materially contributed to the proceedings, and therefore, its fees and
costs in the proceeding are reasonable.

The Commission's position that BCA did not materially contribute to the Commission's
decision and that its costs were unreasonable both hinge on the same argument-namely, that
BCA focused on issues the Commission believes were irrelevant to the instant proceeding. In its
Petition for Rehearing, which the Commission partially granted, and in the technical hearing,

5 Ultimately, the hearing date was set, a hearing was held on October 20,2009, and at its conclusion the
Commission established yet another deadline, October 27,2009, for submitting post-hearing briefs. Tr. Vol. 2, p.
300.
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BCA focused on the Commission's own rationale for the embedded cost methodology of
establishing appropriate line extension allowances. The Commission argues that BCA lost that
argument in 1995 and so was simply rehashing a losing argument in this case. IPUC Brief at 31.
But the Commission is mistaken.
In 1995, BCA urged the Commission to maintain or increase the allowance and/or per lot
refunds that were in effect prior to the Company's 1995 filing. R. Vol. IV, pp. 631, 639. BCA
clearly did not get everything it wanted in that case, and the Commission disagreed with BCA's
argument that the Boise Water precedent should bear on an analysis of the proposed tariff
amendments. R. Vol. IV, p. 636 (Order 26780). However, at Idaho Power's urging, the
Commission determined then that new customers are entitled to have the Company provide a
level of investment equal to that made to serve existing customers in the same class, R. Vol. IV,
p. 639, which provided BCA's members with at least some significant foothold in preventing a
wholesale shifting of costs to new customers. BCA appropriately sought to hold that ground in
this case.
The Commission also now insists that BCA's participation fell outside the scope of the
technical hearing it ordered, which the Commission now argues was limited "to the issue
whether the new 'allowance amount is reasonable based upon the cost of new distribution
facilities [i.e., the standard terminal facilities]. '" IPUC Brief at 31, citing Order No. 30955. That
mischaracterizes what the Commission ordered when it granted BCA reconsideration. It also is
inconsistent with what BCA sought reconsideration of.
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Interlocutory Order 30883, which granted reconsideration to BCA, correctly recognized
that "BCA seeks reconsideration 'to establish an appropriate value of current Company
embedded costs for distribution facilities, a method to true up those costs over time, and a fair
method for line extension costs, allowances and refunds to be paid going forward. '" R. Vol. III,
p. 407. The Commission decision in that Order then states that
BCA may address what allowance is reasonable based on the cost of new
distribution facilities. Pursuant to Rule 332 we adopt the following schedule for
the limited reconsideration of how the allowances in Order No 30853 were
calculated and whether the calculation had a reasonable basis ... we grant limited
reconsideration on the issue of the initial allowance. BCA will have an
opportunity to present evidence of whether the allowance amount is sufficient ...
More specifically, reconsideration is granted on the issue of allowances and
denied on the issues of per-lot refunds and vested interest refunds.

Id., pp. 408-410. The Commission's subsequent Notice of Technical Hearing, Order No. 30900,
notified the parties that
The Commission found it appropriate to grant reconsideration on the limited issue
of the amount of appropriate allowances. BCA was directed to address what
allowance is reasonable based on the cost of new distribution facilities. 6
R. Vol. III, p. 503.

BCA pre-filed its testimony more than a month prior to the technical hearing
demonstrating that an appropriate allowance is based on embedded costs and supporting an
amount of$I,232. R. Vol. III, p. 443, L. 15 through p. 444, L. 2. No party moved to exclude
this testimony as irrelevant, and at the hearing no objection was made to BCA's testimony as
6 "Distribution facilities" or "distribution plant" historically have included terminal facilities and line
extensions. See Order 26780, R. Vol. 3, p.639-640 (allowances are calculated based on the total embedded cost of
distribution facilities, which is made up of two components-one portion for terminal facilities and one portion for
line extensions). The Commission apparently now has redefined distribution facilities to include only "terminal
facilities. "
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being beyond the scope of reconsideration. Nor could they have reasonably done so. BCA's
testimony and cross-examination on reconsideration went directly to the issue of "the amount of
appropriate allowances" in light of the increasing costs of new distribution facilities. It is only
after the fact that the Commission argues that it intended the technical hearing to be limited to
whether a single-phase transformer costs $1,780. 7 BCA's participation throughout this
proceeding focused on material and relevant issues, and the Commissions finding in this regard
and its shifting position on the scope of reconsideration is arbitrary, capricious and unsupported
by the record.

3.

BCA has raised issues of concern to the general body ofratepayers.

The Commission argues that BCA's costs and fees were incurred simply to benefit its
members. IPUC Brief at 33. But rate discrimination, and whether the Commission gives due
consideration to the potential discriminatory effect of the rates it approves, affects all ratepayers.
This is true because utility cost reimbursement is a zero sum game, and where there is
discrimination in rates, one customer or class of customers is unfairly burdened while another
necessarily is unfairly benefitted. The general body of ratepayers and the public's confidence in
their governing bodies are benefitted when parties such as the BCA step forward to argue for
rates that are "just and reasonable" and non-discriminatory, and when necessary, pursue those
arguments through our legal system. The Commission's position ignores the importance to all

7 No technical hearing would have been required on that issue. BCA never disputed the Company's or
Staffs estimates of the cost of terminal facilities. BCA argued that the only appropriate allowance was one based, at
a minimum, on the Company's embedded distribution costs, regardless of whether it was provided as an up-front
allowance, a per-lot refund or some combination of both, and that a "per-transformer" allowance in lieu of a "percustomer" allowance tied to embedded distribution costs resulted in discrimination.
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ratepayers that no discrete class of customers be subject to preferential or discriminatory rates
without sufficient justification.
The Commission also has ignored its own findings concerning BCA when it awarded
BCA intervenor funding in the 1995 case, which involved the same cost-shifting tariff
amendments sought by the Company here. Order 26780, R. Vol. IV, p. 644 (finding that BCA
raised issues of concern to general body of ratepayers). The Commission does not explain why
BCA's advocacy for a fair allowance for new customers (or the developers who build their
homes) in this case is of any less importance to the general body of ratepayers than it has been
previously. The Commission's finding in this respect is arbitrary and capricious.
It is surprising that Idaho Power now argues that there is no apparent class of customers
from which Idaho Power could collect a charge to reimburse it for an intervenor funding award
to BCA. In Order 26780 in the 1995 Rule H Tariff case, after finding that BCA had raised issues
of concern to the general body of ratepayers and was entitled to intervenor funding, the
Commission adopted Idaho Power's proposal "to collect a subdivision lot charge of $11 per lot
to be effective as of the date of this Order, to reimburse the Company for the intervenor funding
award [to BCA]. ... to be removed after being in effect for one year." R. Vol. IV, p. 644.
Finally, aside from getting its math wrong concerning the percentage of all Company
ratepayers that new customers added in 2009 might represent, 8 the Commission ignores the
122,581 new customers who took service between 1995 and 2008, R. Vol. 2, p. 239, under the
8 At page 34 of its brief, the Commission asserts that "new customers represented less than. 005 of a
percent (2,258 + 489,923 = .0046)." However, .0046 is equal to 0.46%, orroughly haIfa percent, not ".005 ofa
percent" (which is five one-thousandths of a percent).
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embedded cost methodology BCA seeks to preserve here. The Commission's argument, of
course, also ignores all potential new customers going forward who would otherwise be entitled
to the treatment BCA has advocated.

E.

BCA is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal.

The standard of review of the Commission's action here is whether it regularly pursued
its authority to set rates or violated any constitutional rights of the appellant in establishing the
Company's Rule H allowances and charges. I.C. § 61-629; Boise Water, 128 Idaho at 538, 916
P.2d at 1263. Its authority to set rates may only be exercised in such a way as to fix nondiscriminatory, and non-preferential rates and charges. Homebuilders, 107 Idaho at 419,690
P.2d at 354. The standard for an award of attorney fees is whether the non-prevailing party acted
with a reasonable basis in fact or law, I.C. § 12-117, or whether an action was pursued, brought
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. I.C. § 12-121. If the Commission
has exceeded its authority, then it has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Fischer v.

City a/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356,109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005).
1.

BCA is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under 1 C. § 12-117.

Respondents each argue that attorney fees and costs are not available under I. C. § 12-117
because (1) it is preempted by the statute providing for intervenor funding in proceedings before
the Commission; and (2) it does not apply to the Commission based on this Court's prior
determination that the Commission is not a "state agency." BCA disagrees with respect to the
first point because the intervenor funding statute does not apply to appellate proceedings
reviewing Commission decisions. On the second point, Respondents offer little argument
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against BCA's request that the Court revisit its determination that the Commission is a
"legislative agency" rather than a "state agency" subject to I.C. § 12-117.
a.

I.e. § 61-617A does not preempt Section 12-117.

Respondents both argue that I.C. § 61-617A preempts I.C. § 12-117. IPUC Brief at 37 n.
12; IPCo Brief at 26-28. BCA disagrees. The plain language of section 61-617A authorizes the
Commission to award intervenor funding to parties "in any proceeding before the Commission."
This statute, then, has nothing to do with awards of fees or costs on appeal of a Commission
decision to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, I.e. § 61-617A does not involve, let alone preempt
any other Idaho statute or law by which the Supreme Court can award fees or costs on appeal.
b.

BCA requests the Court revisit and modify its previous
determination that I. C. § 12-117 does not allow for awards of
attorney fees and costs against the Commission.

BCA recognizes that this Court has rejected awarding attorney fees against the
Commission under I. C. § 12-117 on the ground that the Commission is a "legislative agency,"
and therefore, not a "state agency" subject to Section 12-117. (BCA Brief at 43, citing OwnerOperator Independent Drivers Ass 'n, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 401, 871

P.2d 818 (1994) ("OOIDA"». BCA nevertheless has requested an award under I.C. § 12-117,
BCA Brief at 41-42, and respectfully asks the Court to revisit its previous decisions.
BCA submits that reconsideration and reversal of OOIDA is warranted based on a review
of the statutory definition of "state agency," the cases leading up to the OOIDA decision, and the
statutes creating the Commission. Aside from the rationale used by the OOIDA Court, all
indications are that the Commission is a "state agency" that should be subject to I. e. § 12-117.
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The definition of a "state agency" subject to Section 12-117 is found in I.C. § 67-5201.
I.C. § 12-117(4)(c). Under that definition, "agency" means "each state board, commission,
department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases .... " I.C.
§ 67-5201(2) (emphasis added). The Commission is, of course, a "commission ... authorized by
law to make rules," see, e.g., IDAPA 31.01.01.000 (stating legal authority to make rules of
procedure). Thus, a plain reading of the statutes appears to subject the Commission to I.C. § 12117.
However, in the 1994 OOIDA decision, this Court held that the Commission does not fall
within the plain meaning of "state agency" under I.C. § 12-117 and I.C. § 67-5201 because I.C. §
67-5201 "specifically excludes from the definition of 'state agency' agencies of the legislative
branch." OOIDA, 125 Idaho at 408,871 P.2d at 825. The Court citedA. W. Brown Co., Inc. v.

Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 812, 819, 828 P.2d 841, 848 (1992), but offered no further
explanation before deeming the Commission a "legislative agency" (for the first time in any
reported Idaho case). A closer review of A. W. Brown and its predecessors, however, shows that
the "legislative agency" moniker is not a good fit.

It appears that the term "legislative agency" was based on the following language
originating in a 1955 case quoted by the A. W. Brown Court:
The function of rate making is legislative and not judicial. The commission as the
agency of the legislative department of government exercises delegated legislative
power to make rates.

Petition a/Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 Idaho 474, 480, 284 P.2d 681, 683 (1955)
("Mountain States"). The A. W. Brown Court quoted this language in holding that the
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Commission need not act pursuant to the AP A when it is engaged in a legislative function such
as rate-setting, because, pursuant to Section 67-5201, the APA "specifically does not apply to
'those in the legislative or judicial branch.'" A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 819,828 P.2d at 848.
BCA recognizes that rate making is considered to be a legislative function (sometimes
called "quasi-legislative"), and that the Commission "exercises delegated legislative power to
make rates." Mountain States, 76 Idaho at 480,284 P.2d at 683. However, like all statutorily
created agencies, all of the Commission's powers, whether they be promulgating rules,
determining contested cases or implementing legislative or executive directives, are delegated by
the legislature. But this in and of itself should not make the Commission a so-called "legislative
agency."
Many state agencies exercise what is most often considered quasi-legislative
"rulemaking" authority or quasi-judicial authority-all bestowed by the Legislature-but they
are considered to be "executive" or "independent" agencies, not legislative agencies or judicial
agencies. See, e.g., I.C. § 39-107 (creation of Board of Environmental Quality and delegation of
authority to make rules). In this light, it is not apparent what the Mountain States Court meant
when it called the Commission "the agency of the legislative department of government."
Mountain States, 76 Idaho at 480,284 P.2d at 683.

There was no citation to other precedent in Mountain States for this proposition. A
review of the appellate briefs filed in Mountain States (obtained from the Idaho Supreme Court's
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archives 9) reveals merely that the Respondent in that case mentioned-in the context of
addressing the Supreme Court's standard of review on appeal-that public utility commissions
engage in the "legislative function" of rate-making and that such agencies are delegated
"legislative power" to set rates. Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant at 9-10, Mountain
States, 76 Idaho 474, 284 P.2d 681 (1955) (No. 8194). As far as BCA can discern, the "agency

of the legislative department" language originated in the Mountain States decision without any
supporting authority and the benefit of the parties' full briefing of the point. 10 Viewed in this
light, the "agency of the legislative department of government" language was a passing remark
that should not be construed as a definitive determination that the Commission is part of the
legislative branch of government.
This Court has repeatedly recognized, however, that the Commission is not merely a
"legislative agency" but that it also has ajudicial function. See, e.g., Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v.
Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 128 Idaho 609, 917 P.2d 766 (1996) ("regulatory bodies perform

legislative as well as judicial functions in their proceedings"); Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho

9 BCA has copies of the Mountain States briefs and will gladly provide them to the Court or the parties
upon request.
IO None of the other cases citing the Mountain States language shed light on its meaning. See Grindstone
Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860, 574 P.2d 902 (1978); Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho
Public Utilities Commission, 97 Idaho 113,540 P.2d 775 (1975); Idaho Underground Water Users Ass'n v. Idaho
Power Co., 60 P.U.R.3d 194,404 P.2d 859 (1965). The Court in Intermountain Gas also cited United States v.
Jones, 336 U.S. 641,69 S.Ct. 787, 93 L.Ed. 938 (1949), but only for the proposition that "rate making essentially [is]
legislative in the first instance," which BCA concedes. But so is rulemaking. In a 1921 case not cited in Mountain
States-Natatorium Co. v. Erb, 200 P. 348, 350 (192 I)-the Court stated that "the commission is an arm of the
legislative authority," but this statement was made in the context of explaining that the Commission is "not a court
of justice, within the meaning of Const. art. I, § 18," and thus also does not shed light on whether the Commission is
a "state agency" subject to I.C. § 12- I 17.
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Public Utilities Commission, 102 Idaho 672, 676, 637 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1981) ("proceedings
before the Commission are quasi-judicial"). I I
The statutes creating and governing the Commission support a conclusion that it is more
"executive" or "independent" than "legislative." By statute, the Commission's members are
appointed by the Governor (with senate approval), I.C. § 61-201, and they are subject to removal
by the Governor, I.C. § 61-202, and the Commission reports annually to the Governor. I.C.61-

214. See also Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 140, 804 P.2d 308, 313 (1990) ("The legislature
must ratify certain executive appointees such as the ... members of the Idaho Public Utilities
Commission").
In their Respondent's Briefs, neither Idaho Power nor the Commission expends much
effort defending the proposition that the Commission is a "legislative agency" rather than a state
agency. Idaho Power merely rests on the OOIDA decision and does not offer any argument
against BCA's suggestion that the Court revisit its determination on this point. IPCo Brief at 28.
For its part, in addition to citing one ofthe pre-OOIDA cases discussed above (A. W Brown), the
Commission then argues that the OOIDA interpretation must be correct because the Legislature's

post-OOIDA amendments to I.C. § 12-117 did not address it. IPUC Brief at 37-38.
It is true that this Court has recognized the canon of statutory interpretation that a
legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of existing judicial decisions when it amends a

II BCA notes that this Court has recognized "[i]t is not always possible to draw a sharp line of distinction
between legislative, judicial and executive powers or functions, nor does it appear necessary to the purpose ofthe
constitutional separation of powers, to do so." Electors ofBig Butte Area v. State Bd of Educ., 78 Idaho 602, 607,
308 P.2d 225,228 (1957).
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statute, see, e.g., Ultrawall v. Washington Mut. Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 836,25 PJd 855,859
(2001), but BCA believes the use of this canon would be misplaced here. The recent amendment
of I.e. § 12-117 was made specifically and expressly in response to this Court's 2009 decision in

Rammell v. Department ofAgriculture, 147 Idaho 415, 210 P.3d 523 (2009), that the statute did
not allow for awards of attorney fees in administrative proceedings.

12

There is no indication that

the amendment was intended to address any other cases or issues. It is speculation to suggest
that the Legislature's 2010 amendment is a concurrence with a 1994 interpretation by this Court,
since it is equally likely that the Legislature simply was focused on the exigencies raised by the

Rammell decision described in the H.B. 421 's Statement of Purpose.
Access to attorney fees against the Commission where it has exceeded its authority and
acted arbitraril y fulfills I. C. § 12-117' s purpose of "serv[ ing] as a deterrent to groundless or
arbitrary action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes
agencies should never have made," Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145
Idaho 121, 138, 176 P.3d 126, 143 (2007), BCA respectfully requests this Court reverse its

12

The Statement of Purpose for H.B. 421 (the bill that amended I.C. § 12-117 in 2010) states:

In 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court construed Idaho Code Section 12-117 to permit awards of costs
and attorney fees to prevailing parties not only in court cases, but also in administrative cases.
Under the statute, such awards are only made if the non-prevailing party has pursued or defended
the case without a basis in fact or law. On June 1,2009, in the case ofRammell v. Department of
Agriculture, the Supreme Court reversed its 1989 decision and ruled that attorney fees could not
be awarded in administrative cases. This bill will restore the law as it has existed since 1989, and
it will become effective on May 31, 2009 so that those administrative cases which were pending
when the Rammell decision was issued will not be adversely affected by the Supreme Courts
ruling.
Statement of Purpose, R.S. 19257 (2010).
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previous decisions finding the Commission is not a "state agency" subject to I.C. § 12-117, and
award BCA its costs and attorney fees on appeal as the prevailing party.
2.

BCA requests the Court grant it attorney fees and costs on appeal under
the private attorney general doctrine.

As BCA asserted in its Appellant's Brief, it is entitled to an award of attorney fees under
the private attorney general doctrine because its appeal in this case satisfies that doctrine's three
requirements: (1) great strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the
litigation; (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on
the plaintiff; and (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Heller v.
Cennarusa, 106 Idaho 571,578,682 P.2d 524,532 (1984). BCA incorporates by reference its
Appellant's Briefs arguments on this point.
The Court should reject the Commission's argument that "the private attorney general
doctrine is not available to award attorney fees against the state." IPUC Brief at 25. First, the
case cited by the Commission for this proposition, Kootenai Medical Center v. Bonner County
Comm'rs, 141 Idaho 7, 105 P.3d 667 (2004), did not hold that the doctrine was inapplicable to
the "state," but rather that it was inapplicable to "state agencies" that are subject to I.C. § 12-117.
Id. at 10-11, 105 P.3d at 670-71. If this Court continues to subscribe to its holding in OOIDA,
that the Commission is not a state agency subject to I.C. § 12-117, the private attorney general
doctrine should be available to BCA.
Similarly, the Court should reject the Commission's argument that the private attorney
general doctrine is inapplicable in this situation because this Court has held that the private
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attorney general doctrine arises from the authority ofI.C. § 12-121 and that Section 12-121 has
been held to "not ... authorize an award of attorney fees on appeal of an agency ruling." IPUC
Brief at 35 (citing State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 718, 725, 947 P.2d 391,
398 (1997); Duncan v. State Ed. ofAccountancy, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d _ , slip op. at 6,

2010 WL 1632647 (Apr. 23,2010». The cited cases held that the private attorney general
doctrine (which is grounded in I.C. § 12-121) is not available against a "state agency" that is
subject to Section 12-117. Thus, if the Commission is not considered a "state agency" subject to
I.C. § 12-117, then the statute does not preempt the private attorney general doctrine.
BCA disagrees with the Commission assertion that BCA's pursuit of this litigation does
not benefit the public. IPUC Brief at 36. While it is true that BCA represents its members, many
of whom are in the real estate development profession, their efforts will benefit a significant
portion of the public (i.e. any residential customer who connects to Idaho Power's electrical
system). Contrary to the Commission's and Idaho Power's assertions, this is a significant
number of people. Idaho Power's 2009 planning projections estimate 10,000 new customers per
year, or roughly 200,000 new customers, through 2029. Idaho Power, Our Energy Future:
Responsible Planning (http://www.idahopower.comJAboutUs/CompanyInformation/ourFuture/
responsiblePlanning.cfm) (last visited Aug. 3,2010).13

13 In this same publication, Idaho Power asserts that yearly "demand for electricity during peak-load hours
is expected to increase by ... enough electricity to power 31,800 average homes." In other words, while Idaho
Power expects to adq 10,000 new customers each year, electricity demand will increase by more than three times
that many homes. Apparently, new customers are not the primary drivers of increased utility costs but, instead,
increased use by existing customers causes increased demands on the system.
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BCA also believes it unlikely that the state's Attorney General (which represents the
Commission) or an individual customer would take up this issue against the Commission and
Idaho Power. In short, ifBCA did not champion the rights ofldaho Power's new customers,
there is little chance that anyone would.
BCA has diligently pursued this matter in good faith despite substantial financial
hardship because of the extreme importance of the issues, and because the Commission has,
without a reasonable basis, approved a discriminatory line extension charge structure. It is
inherently in the general public's interest for discriminatory practices to be challenged. If the
Court determines that the Commission is insulated from awards of attorney fees when the public
challenges one of its decisions, BCA submits it is then even more important for this Court to take
a hard Look at the Commission's actions.
BCA thus respectfully requests the Court award it attorney fees and costs either by
reversing its prior ruling regarding the applicability of 1.C. § 12-117 to the Commission, or under
the private attorney general doctrine.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Order 30955 should be set aside and the Company's
Application denied with respect to the amended line extension charges, allowances, and refunds.
In addition, BCA is entitled to intervenor funding to the full extent allowed by statute. BCA
respectfully requests its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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